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case with cabotage, short sea shipping and ﬁshing. In fact, most ocean carriers ﬂy ﬂags of
convenience and the majority of ﬂags of the EC member states are granted to vessels
performing cabotage, passenger ferry services between two neighbouring countries and
ﬁshing. Thus, the rules will have to be changed for the majority of them.
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WHO DECIDES ON JURISDICTION CLAUSES?
Erich Gasser v. MISAT
At last the European Court of Justice (‘‘ECJ’’) has decided one of the key issues at the
heart of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters 1968 (the ‘‘Brussels Convention’’): which court has jurisdiction to
decide whether there is a jurisdiction clause: the court ﬁrst seised in the dispute or the
court chosen, if that is the court second seised? This involves considering the interrelation-
ship between Arts 17 and 21 of the Brussels Convention. Although the ECJ in Erich
Gasser GmbH v.  MISAT SrL
1 has decided these issues in the context of the Brussels
Convention, the decision will apply equally to Arts 23 and 27 of the Council Regulation
(EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
2 (‘‘the Brussels Regula-
tion’’), which replaces the Brussels Convention,
3 and to the EFTA Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1998
(the ‘‘Lugano Convention’’).
4
The Gasser decision completely reverses the controversial decision in Continental Bank
NA v. Aeakos Compania Naviera SA.
5 There the Court of Appeal held that, although the
Greek court was ﬁrst seised, the English court had jurisdiction because there was an
exclusive English jurisdiction clause. The wording of the Brussels Convention itself did
not clearly answer whether Art 17 was an exception to Art 21; but the Court of Appeal was
so determined that its interpretation of the issue was correct, that it refused to refer the
issue as a preliminary matter to the ECJ. Not only this, but the English court also granted
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25 CASE AND COMMENTan anti-suit injunction to restrain the Greek borrower from continuing the proceedings in
Greece in breach of the English jurisdiction agreement. In Evialis SA v. SIAT
6 Andrew
Smith J refused to distinguish Continental Bank v. Aeakos on the ground that the Brussels
Regulation applied and not the Brussels Convention.
Other Contracting States considered that the court ﬁrst seised must always establish its
jurisdiction  ﬁrst, including whether it must decline jurisdiction due to a jurisdiction
agreement. Thus, in Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo Trumpy
SpA,
7 the Italian court referred 14 issues of interpretation on Art 17 of the Brussels
Convention to the ECJ but it did not question its own right to be applying Art 17,
presumably on the basis that it was so obvious to the Italian court that it, as the court ﬁrst
seised, should do so. Attempts to clarify this issue by amending the Brussels and Lugano
Convention foundered.
In Erich Gasser v. MISAT, MISAT brought proceedings in Rome against Gasser. Nearly
eight months later, Gasser brought proceedings which involved the same cause of action
in Austria. Gasser relied on payment of invoices for childrens’ clothing sold to MISAT
under a contract which included a jurisdiction clause to which there had never been an
objection. Gasser argued that that meant the (Austrian) Landsgericht Feldkirch alone had
jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. On appeal, the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck referred
issues of interpretation to the ECJ.
Even though the trial judge in Austria had not determined whether there was a
jurisdiction clause, the ECJ held that it could determine the issues referred to it, as they
were not hypothetical. If the European Court determined that Art 21 applied, despite the
existence of a jurisdiction agreement, then the Austrian court would not need to go
through the potentially costly exercise of determining whether there was indeed a
jurisdiction agreement. This was the conclusion to which the court came. This was clearly
the correct decision. It would have been ludicrous to say than the European Court could
not make a decision because the Austrian court had not determined that there was a
jurisdiction agreement when the European Court’s decision is that the Austrian court has
no jurisdiction to make that decision.
The ECJ referred to the main aim of the Brussels Convention, s 8, to prevent parallel
proceedings and to avoid irreconcilable judgments. Article 21 provides for a simple rule
based on the chronological order in which proceedings are brought. The court limited the
exception to that rule in Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v.  New Hampshire Co
8 to
exclusive jurisdiction under Art 16. The ECJ rejected the United Kingdom government’s
argument that the court designated by the agreement conferring jurisdiction will, in
general, be in a better position to rule as to the effect of such an agreement since it will
be necessary to apply the substantive law of the Member State in whose territory the
designated court is situated.
9 The court second seised is never in a better position that the
court  ﬁrst seised to determine whether the latter has jursidiction. That jurisdiction is
determined by applying the requirements of Art 17 and only those requirements. Neither
court may apply its national law or any other restrictions as to form, language, appearance
or link with the dispute to determine whether there is a  jurisdiction clause, as is clear from
6. [2003] EWHC 863 (Comm).
7. (Case C–159/97) [1999] ILPr 492.
8. [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 204.
9. Denby v. Hellenic Mediterranean Lines Co UK [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 320.
26 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLYCastelletti. The merit of this decision is that the court second seised will only have
jurisdiction if the court ﬁrst seised declines jurisdiction because there is a jurisdiction
clause. Otherwise one could ﬁnd that the court second seised determined the issue whether
there is a jurisdiction clause and reached the conclusion that there is not. The matter would
then revert to the court ﬁrst seised.
Delay
The ECJ also considered whether Art 21 may be departed from where the proceedings in
the court ﬁrst seised have taken an excessively long time and proceeded on the basis that
the average duration of proceedings before the Italian courts is excessively long. Gasser
argued that Art 21 must be interpreted as excluding excessively protracted proceedings, ie,
exceeding three years, which are contrary to Art 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Thus, where no decision on jurisdiction has been made within six months or no
ﬁnal decision on jurisdiction has been given within one year, Gasser argued that the court
second seised would be entitled to rule both on the question of jurisdiction and, after
slightly longer periods, on the substance of the case. The court rejected any such exception
as there is no such provision in the Brussels Convention and there must be certainty.
Practical consequences
It is still very important to advise a party to a contract to have an exclusive jurisdiction
clause. Indeed, it is even more important that the parties make a very clear choice, ideally
in a written contract signed by both parties which falls within Art 17(a). The problem in
a case such as Gasser is that there was a dispute between the parties as to the existence
of the jurisdiction clause, as it had only been inserted in invoices presumably sent after the
contract had been concluded.
10 Situations such as these raise genuine disputes as to
whether the jurisdiction clause forms part of the contract. So do situations where there is
a dispute such as to whether a contract incorporates the terms of another contract
11 or a
case of the battle of the forms.
12 The issues raised by whether a jurisdiction clause satisﬁes
the requirements of Art 17(c) are complex. Thus, in Castelletti the Italian court referred
no less than 14 issues of interpretation on that provision to the ECJ. In that case the Italian
courts had very properly taken the point that, if there was an English jurisdiction clause
in a bill of lading, they would have no jurisdiction. The problem was whether there was
such a clause. The parties have to help themselves and address the issue of jurisdiction up
front, rather than trying to slip a jurisdiction clause into an invoice or bury it in standard
terms incorporated by reference. In Gasser the UK government argued that the
commercial practice of agreeing which courts are to have jurisdiction in the event of
10. See also Mainschiffahrts – Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les Gravieres Rhenanes Sarl (Case C–106/95)
[1997] I ECR 911.
11. See AIG Europe v. Ethniki [1998] 4 All ER 301; AIG v. QBE [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 268 at [17] and [26]
on whether the words of incorporation in a reinsurance contract are clear enough to incorporate the jurisdiction
clause from the insurance contract; and Siboti K/S v. BP France SA [2003] EWHC 1278; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
364, on the incorporation of a charterparty jurisdiction clause into a bill of lading.
12. See G. Dannemann, ‘‘The Battle of the Forms and the Conﬂict of Laws’’, ch 11 of F.D. Rose (ed), Lex
Mercatoria: Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis Reynolds (2000) (hereafter ‘‘Lex
Mercatoria’’), 199 and esp. 210–215.
27 CASE AND COMMENTdisputes should be supported and encouraged, as they promote legal certainty. However,
this assumes that the parties have made a clear agreement. The Brussels Convention, and
the Brussels Regulation in its turn, recognize party choice and will enforce it provided that
choice satisﬁes the requirements of Art 17.
Furthermore, even if there is a clear jurisdiction clause, the party wishing to rely on the
clause must seise the court chosen ﬁrst. Fortunately, under the Brussels Regulation a new
Art 30 provides when a court is seised and this makes it easier to seise the English court
ﬁrst than was formerly the case under the Brussels Convention.
13 The Brussels provisions
really do encourage the parties to sue ﬁrst and settle later. This may be no bad thing, as
there is nothing like a claim form to focus the mind on settlement and the jurisdiction of
the proceedings is a major tactic in achieving that goal.
Where the decision is very tough is where, for example, a party wishes to enforce a
clear English jurisdiction clause but the other party ﬂagrantly breaches that clause and it
takes considerable time for the court ﬁrst seised to decide that it has no jurisdiction. The
claimant in the English proceedings would presumably be able to recover the additional
costs of the proceedings in the court ﬁrst seised as damages for breach of the jurisdiction
agreement and interest for the whole of the period it has been kept out of its money. This
will not help the small business which has foundered due to non-payment.
Anti-suit injunctions
Not only was the Court of Appeal so sure that their interpretation of the interrelationship
between Arts 17 and 21 was correct in Continental Bank v. Aeakos; but they went further
and granted an anti-suit injunction to restrain the Greek borrower from pursuing
proceedings before the Greek court which was ﬁrst seised. The use of anti-suit injunctions
has been seen as highly controversial in the European arena
14 and indeed some
Contracting States to the Brussels Convention have refused to serve them on the ground
that they are unconstitutional and interfere with their sovereignty.
15 Despite a note of
caution by the Court of Appeal in Phillip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd v.
Bamberger,
16 the English courts have continued to grant them to enforce a jurisdiction
agreement and to prevent an abuse of process in Turner v. Grovit.
17 In the latter case the
House of Lords has referred to the ECJ the issue of whether an anti-suit injunction can be
granted to prevent an abuse of process in the European context. The European Court has
not yet given judgment but the opinion of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomber AG
18 considers them
contrary to the spirit of the Brussels Convention. The irony is that, had the English courts
accepted that the court ﬁrst seised should determine whether there is a jurisdiction
agreement, there would be no need for an anti-suit injunction. As a result of the decision
in Gasser, the English courts, if second seised, will have no jurisdiction to determine
whether there is a jurisdiction agreement and will not therefore be in a position to grant
13. The Freccia del Nord [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 388; Dresser UK Ltd v. Falcongate Freight Management Ltd
(The Duke of Yare) [1992] QB 502; Neste Chemicals SA v. D K Line SA (The Sargasso) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
6; and Internationale Nederlanden Aviation Lease BV v. The Civil Aviation Authority [1997] CLC 43.
14. See, eg, A. Briggs, ‘‘Anti-Suit Injunctions in a Complex World’’, ch 12 of Rose (ed), Lex Mercatoria.
15. Re the Enforcement of an English Anti-Suit Injunction [1997] ILPr 320, (Dusseldorf CA).
16. [1996] CLC 1757, 1789.
17. [2001] UKHL 65; [2002] 1 WLR 107.
18. [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 216.
28 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLYa remedy for breach of that agreement, unless the court ﬁrst seised declines jurisdiction.
This does not affect the use of anti-suit injunctions where the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions and the Brussels Regulation do not apply, as different considerations apply
where there is no mutual agreement as to jurisdiction between two states.
19
Conclusion
Gasser is a welcome decision to end the divergence of opinion amongst the EC Member
States as to the spremacy of Art 21 over Art 17 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions
and Art 23 over Art 27 of the Brussels Regulation. It also ends the need for anti-suit
injunctions to enforce jurisdiction agreements amongst the EC Member States. Article 21
provides for a simple and inﬂexible rule based on the chronological order in which
proceedings were brought and the rule does not bend for jurisdiction clauses or delays.
The costs involved in a dispute as to whether there is a jurisdiction clause and the delay
in obtaining judgment in the court of one’s choice may well outweigh the beneﬁts of
choice of jurisdiction. Thus, a contracting party should do its utmost to prevent such a
dispute arising by focusing on the jurisdiction clause at the negotiation stage and
commencing proceedings promptly in the chosen court.
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